Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy by Clark, R. H.
Volume 19 Issue 6 Article 1 
1974 
Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy 
R. H. Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Fourth Amendment 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. H. Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 Vill. L. Rev. 833 (1974). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Villanova Law Review
VOLUME 19 JUNE 1974 NUMBER 6
CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF THE PENUMBRAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
R. H. CLARKI
O NE OF THE WARREN COURT'S foremost contributions to
the ever-evolving heritage of American constitutional law was its
"discovery" of the constitutional right to privacy. Certainly, past
Courts had spoken on numerous occasions about a "right of privacy."'
Indeed, during the last two decades the fourth amendment's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures had become, in short-
hand terminology, "the right to privacy."2 Occasional decisions in
the first' and fifth amendment 4 areas had also made reference to such
a right. However, it was not until the 1965 decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut5 that the issue of constitutional privacy came suddenly to
the forefront. Not only was the factual background of the case dra-
matic, with the state prosecuting a physician for counseling his patients
in the use of contraceptives,6 but the strategy employed by the Court's
majority in striking down the Connecticut statute7 was unique. Gris-
wold marks the first occasion upon which the Supreme Court dis-
cussed a composite right to privacy, drawing its substance from a
number of the Bill of Rights' guarantees in language which appeared
to indicate a strong constitutional presumption against any manner
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Denison University. A.B., University
of California (Riverside), 1966; M.A., University of California (Santa Barbara),
1967, Ph.D., 1970.
1. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
2. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
notes 240-55 and accompanying text infra.
3. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Id. at 480.
7. The statute provided:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose
of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned
not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53-32 (1958) (repealed by P.A. 828, §214, 1971).
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of governmental infringement. The importance of this right was re-
cently underscored by the Burger Court's heavy reliance upon privacy
to justify limiting state abortion statutes.8
The right to privacy, as it has emerged from Griswold and the
other decisions discussed below, is composed of three fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees and has three principal dimensions. The first
amendment protection of free speech and assembly is designed to
safeguard the anonymity of political belief and, especially, political
association. It guarantees that the individual is not compelled to pub-
licly disclose the content of his political beliefs or his membership in
political associations. The fourth amendment, certainly the core ele-
ment in constitutional privacy, protects one's reasonable expectations
of privacy by imposing stiff procedural requisites which must be met
before a breach in the sanctity of one's physical location may occur. 9
The third and most absolute component is the fifth amendment's ban
on compulsory self-incrimination, a right which safeguards 'the inner-
most sanctity of a person's mind from compulsory governmental intru-
sion. The total effect of these guarantees is to create a zone of privacy
around various personal interests that the government cannot violate
without a showing of proper justification. The significance of Griswold
lies in its forging of these disparate lines of development into an in-
tegrated and broader right to privacy. The discussion which follows
focuses upon these diverse lines in order to substantiate the Griswold
thesis, as well as to acquaint the reader with the varied sources of
the right to privacy.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE Griswold OPINIONS
A. Mr. Justice Douglas (five Justices)
In the view of Justice Douglas, the member of the Court most
consistently concerned about privacy in modern society, the attempted
regulation of the most intimate aspect of the marriage relationship
(the statute prohibited the giving of advice, instruction, or information
pertaining to contraception) invaded a constitutional "zone of privacy,"
even though no such right was explicitly recognized in the Constitu-
tion." For Justice Douglas, the Constitution's silence did not neces-
sarily preclude the existence of such a zone. Emanating from the ex-
plicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights were penumbras which gave the
stated rights "life and substance."" As one commentator has written:
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187
(1973). See notes 350-56 and accompanying text infra.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
10. Griswold v. United States, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 484.
[VOL. 19 : p. 833
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[T]he Constitution protects, without specific enumeration, certain
essential freedoms of the individual. Labeled peripheral rights,
these freedoms are derived from the penumbra or total scope of
the constitutional amendments. The penumbral approach incor-
porates rights not explicitly included in any amendment with the
rationale that their existence is vital "in making express guaran-
tees of the various amendments fully meaningful." Without these
peripheral rights the enumerated rights would be vulnerable. 12
Thus, the rights of free speech and press, for example, must necessarily
include rights to distribute, read, and receive such matter in order
to fully implement the intended protection.'
Douglas' analysis of the emanations from the first eight amend-
ments further supported the existence of a "zone of privacy." Case
law had established that the first amendment protected political asso-
ciation from governmental intrusion ;14 that the third amendment safe-
guarded the individual from intrusions into his domestic privacy;15
and that the fourth and fifth amendments recognized a zone of privacy
in criminal prosecutions." Finally, the ninth amendment recognized
that not all rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated
in its language. Hence, "[t]hese cases bore witness that the right of
privacy .. .was a legitimate one."'" Consequently, the unnecessarily
broad and ill-defined Connecticut statute was held invalid as an in-
vasion of this "zone of privacy."
Justice Douglas had long been interested in the concept of a right
to privacy, and had previously stated his views on its constitutional
origin. As early as 1951, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,'
a case involving the broadcasting of radio programs on municipal
buses in the District of Columbia, he had declared:
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in
the Fifth Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint;
12. 17 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 601, 602 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
13. 381 U.S. at 482-83.
14. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1959).
15. While, as this article will show, the first, fourth, and fifth amendments have
all contributed to the development of constitutional privacy. Justice Douglas' reliance
upon the third amendment appears misplaced. First, there appear to be neither cases
nor commentary giving any definitive interpretation to the third amendment. See E.
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 60 (1957). Second,
the only discussion of the proposed amendment during the first Congress indicated a
concern not with privacy but rather with the expense and inconvenience of boarding
troops. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (1834). Representative Sumter is quoted as having
stated: "Their property would lie at the mercy of men irritated by a refusal, and well
disposed to destroy the peace of the family." Id. Finally, the third amendment is
obsolete and anachronistic in contemporary American life. See R. RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 229 (1955).
16. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
17. 381 U.S. at 485.
18. 343 U.S. 451 (1951).
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it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of free-
dom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all free-
dom. Part of our claim to privacy is in the prohibition of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures....
The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the in-
dividual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. 9
Even at this early point, Douglas clearly believed that the right of
privacy permeated several of the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The most relevant statement of Douglas' viewpoint had come in
Poe v. Ullman,2 ° an earlier case than Griswold, dealing with this
same Connecticut statute. There, the majority had rejected an attack
upon the anti-contraceptive law on the basis of insufficient standing due
to desuetude in the statute's enforcement. 2 ' In a pointed dissent,
Douglas expounded upon his conception of privacy and its sources.
The Justice relied very heavily upon the first amendment:
The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to
his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights
as to need no extended discussion. . . .The State has no power
to put any sanctions of any kind on him for any views or beliefs
that he has or for any advice he renders. These are his profes-
sional domains into which the State may not intrude. . . .Only
free exchange of views and information is consistent with "a civili-
zation of the dialogue ....""
Justice Douglas also felt that due process was offended. He seemed
to indicate a change from his persistent concurrence with Justice Black
in advocating the incorporation theory23 of the fourteenth amend-
ment: "Though I believe that 'due process' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not think
it is restricted and confined to them."' 24 Then, after citing cases demon-
strating the rights to travel25 and to bring up children, 2 the Justice
stated: " 'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes gains content from
the emanations of other specific guarantees . . . or from experience
19. Id. at 467-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
21. Id. at 501-09 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 513-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. The "total incorporation theory" holds that all of the Bill of Rights (the
first eight amendments) is made binding upon the states through the fourteenth
amendment, either by that amendment's due process clause or its privileges and
immunities clause. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-17 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). This view has never persuaded a majority of the Court. See, e.g.,
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
24. 367 U.S. at 516.
25. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
26. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
[VOL. 19: p. 833836
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 6 [1974], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/1
JUNE 1974] PENUMBRAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
with the requirements of a free society."2 In fact, Douglas candidly
commented that his disagreement with the Court's previous use of
substantive due process2" had been with the standards used, and not
merely with the application of such standards. Consequently, Douglas
appeared to be leaning toward the "fundamental rights"29 theory of
due process rather than his previous incorporation viewpoint.
By the time of the Griswold opinion, Douglas had modified his
position once more. His heavy stress on the penumbral approach,
utilizing as it does the first eight amendments, indicated a probable
return to the incorporation theory; his reference to the ninth amend-
ment was perhaps only a "clincher" to the argument. 0 Thomas I.
Emerson, who argued the case, felt that although the first amendment
was not ostensibly relied upon (for there had been conduct as well as
speech) ,' its influence did permeate the opinion. Certainly, Justice
Douglas did make reference to efforts to contract "the spectrum of
available knowledge,"3 2 and did draw his primary examples of emana-
tion from the first amendment area, namely freedom of association,
freedom of inquiry and thought, and the right to teach. Yet, appar-
ently, no single guarantee in the Bill of Rights came close enough to
suffice as the protection for privacy. Therefore, the penumbral, multi-
provision approach to the "zone of privacy" was adopted."
B. Mr. Justice Goldberg (three Justices)
In a unique concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg agreed that the
Connecticut statute violated the constitutional right to privacy of the
involved married couples. However, it is his reasoning that is of
27. 367 U.S. at 517.
28. The fourteenth amendment forbids any state to enact or enforce a law depriv-
ing any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court
has frequently been sharply divided over what standard should be used in determining
due process. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930). The Court's present position is that substantive
due process is not offended if the statute bears some rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose. "We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legis-
lation." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1962). See also Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421 (1952).
29. The "fundamental rights" theory maintains that the fourteenth amendment
protects all fundamental rights, whether mentioned in the Constitution or not. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra for Justice Goldberg's test as to what is a
fundamental right.
30. See 54 Ky. L.J. 794, 796 (1966).
31. Appellants admitted that they had engaged in actions (giving examinations,
etc.) as well as speech, but argued: (1) that the conduct was essential to a meaningful
exercise of free speech; and (2) speech and action should not be lumped together to
the detriment of first amendment rights. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219, 221-22 (1965).
32. 381 U.S. at 482.
33. See Comment, Connecticut Contraceptive Ban v. Right of Privacy, 34 U.
Mo. K.C.L. REv. 95 (1966). 5
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primary interest, for in an almost unprecedented fashion, Justice Gold-
berg based his opinion largely upon the "forgotten" ninth amendment :
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that
the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically men-
tioned in the first eight constitutional amendments. . . . It was
proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumer-
ated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential
rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be
interpreted as a denial that others would be protected. 5
Hence, the ninth amendment (although not an independent source of
rights) was meant to remind us 'that certain "fundamental personal
rights should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other
way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight
constitutional amendments.""0  And although the ninth amendment
per se was not applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, it protected certain basic personal liberties which were deemed
"fundamental."
The key question thus became what standards were to be used to
determine whether a particular right was "fundamental"? Goldberg
suggested a number of possible indicators: tradition and collective
conscience of the American people;7 the fundamental principles and
liberties which formed the foundation of our political institutions ;38
and the requirements of a free society3 9 It was obvious to Justice
Goldberg that the sanctity of the family and marital relationship, "a
relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization,''4 was
among those intrinsic rights which demanded protection from abridge-
ment by government.
It is interesting to note, however, that privacy appeared a less
absolute value for Justice Goldberg than for Justice Douglas. 4 ' Justice
Goldberg seemed quite willing to apply a balancing perspective when
34. For a comprehensive analysis of the ninth amendment's legislative and judicial
histories, including its role in protecting privacy, see Clark, The Ninth Amendment
and Constitutional Privacy, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 83 (1973).
35. 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 492.
37. Id. at 493.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 494.
41. In his recent concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice
Douglas stated his view that first amendment rights are absolute. Id. at 211-12(Douglas, J., concurring). However, he also stated that numerous freedoms in which
privacy is an issue (his examples: "marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and
the education and upbringing of children") are "subject to some control by the police
power." Id. Therefore, privacy in his view consists of some rights that are absolute
and some that are properly subject to a balancing test. Id.
[VOL. 19: p. 833
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the right to privacy conflicted with a legitimate need of government.
He cited several cases for the proposition that the marital relation
was a fundamental right which the state could not abridge by merely
showing that such would bear some rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose.42 The Justice easily dismissed the state's argument
that the statute discouraged extramarital affairs by noting that the
effect of the statute reached far beyond the evil with which it was
intended to deal, and intruded upon the privacy of all married couples.3
Hence, a compelling state interest in encroaching the right had to be
demonstrated to justify the state's invasion of marital privacy and no
such interest was demonstrated. The right of marital privacy was
a fundamental right "retained by the people" through the ninth amend-
ment, and, absent a compelling state interest, it could not constitutionally
be infringed by the state since it was protected by the fourteenth
amendment.
Justice Goldberg's unexpected reliance upon the long-dormant
ninth amendment quite naturally triggered speculation as to the reason
for his views. One commentator has suggested a possible explanation:
Apparently Goldberg felt he could not rely solely on the four-
teenth amendment, because the Court had denuded its substantive
content by deferring to the legislature the determination of the
reasonableness of regulatory legislation and by tending to limit
the application of the due process clause to the incorporation or
absorption of the specific rights of the first eight amendments. By
coupling the ninth amendment to the fourteenth, Goldberg appar-
ently attempted to revive some of the latter's substantive content
and invoke the precedents upholding the right of family privacy. 44
Yet, the Court had consistently used the "fundamental rights" method
of interpreting the fourteenth amendment with apparently no need to.
resort to the ninth amendment. Indeed, it has been argued that Justice
Goldberg's opinion can be seen as refuting the rationale of Black's incor-
poration theory 45 while supporting that of either the "absorption pro-
cess" 46 or the test of Palko v. Connecticut47 favored by Justice Harlan.
42. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399.
(1923).
43. 367 U.S. at 497.
44. Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncom-
monly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680, 686 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
45. 12 WAYNE L. Rlv. 479, 481 (1966).
46. See 12 WAYNE L. REv. 479 (1966), where the author characterizes Justice
Goldberg's, as well as Justice Douglas', approach to the fourteenth amendment in,
Griswold as the "absorption process." Id. at 480 n.14, 481. In contrast to the total
incorporation view, the absorption approach advocates a "gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require." Davidson
v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
47. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko held that a state's denial of rights enumerated
in the first eight amendments offended the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
JUNE 1974]
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C. Mr. Justice Harlan
The concurrence of Justice Harlan represented the traditional
Cardozo-oriented approach the Court had utilized in the past to give
content to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As
Justice Cardozo had indicated in Palko v. Connecticut,4" the due process
clause protected values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."49
For Justice Harlan, this meant that the content of the due process
clause was not limited to the explicit elements .of the Bill of Rights, as
in Justice Black's incorporation theory,5" but that it also protected
rights which, independent of their origin, were deemed to be "funda-
mental." As a result, Justice Harlan was distressed in Griswold by
Douglas' penumbral approach which was limited to the Bill of Rights
guarantees:
In other words, what I find implicit in the Court's opinion
is that the "incorporation" doctrine may be used to restrict the
reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me this is
just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the
"incorporation" approach to impose upon the States all the re-
quirements of the Bill of Rights as found in the provisions of the
first eight amendments and in the decisions of this court interpret-
ing them."'
Therefore, Justice Harlan's test of fundamental rights is probably
identical - save for its reliance upon the due process clause rather
than the ninth amendment - to Justice Goldberg's, undoubtedly in-
cluding the latter's tests for determining what is intrinsic to liberty.
However, as he had indicated in his dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman,52 Justice Harlan did not share in Justice Goldberg's reluct-
ance to employ the notion of substantive due process. If due process
were limited to procedural fairness only, "it would fail to reach those
situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accom-
plished by legislation which by operating in the future could, given
even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, never-
theless destroy the enjoyment of all three.""8 Justice Harlan's guiding
standards emerged from the context of American history, values, and
postulates of liberty: "It is a rational continuum which, broadly speak-
ment only when such rights were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . .. ."
Id. at 324-25 (1937). In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1968), the Court held
the Palko approach to be inappropriate when applied to the fifth amendment's doublejeopardy prohibition, and overruled Palko insofar as it was inconsistent with its hold-
ing. Id. at 793-94.
48. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). But see note 47 supra.
49. Id. at 324-25.
50. See note 23 supra.
51. 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 541.
[VOL. 19 : p. 833
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ing, includes a freedom from all substantial and arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints . . . ." Therefore, any statute which sought
to allow government to invade the privacy of the home had to be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. While Justice Harlan had pointed to the
third and fourth amendments in Poe as two sources of domestic
privacy, in Griswold he emphasized that due process privacy was not
dependent upon any of the amendments or their radiations. Never-
theless, as he had stated in Poe, "The right of privacy most manifestly
is not an absolute." 5 In this situation, however, the state had sanc-
tioned the marital relationship, unlike adultery or homosexuality, and
the means adopted ostensibly to prevent marital infidelity - suppress-
ing knowledge of contraceptives - swept far too broadly to be justified.
Justice Harlan concluded that the state had violated marital privacy
with insufficient justification.
This examination of the Griswold opinions has demonstrated that
three different rationales were employed therein to reach the same
conclusion, that Connecticut's statute violated a constitutional right
to privacy."0 It is submitted that Justice Douglas' opinion is the most
significant of the three approaches. Not only was it the thesis agreed
upon by a majority of the Court, but it also offers the broadest poten-
tial for further expansion of a general right to privacy beyond the
confines of Griswold's concern with marital privacy. The following
discussion centers upon the three major prongs of the emanation
approach: the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. It is these three
components which, when united into a complex constitutional right,
establish the fundamental presumption in favor of individual privacy.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PROTECTION
OF POLITICAL PRIVACY
One characteristic hallmark of the cold war's unceasing fear of
internal subversion was the expanded role played by both state and
federal legislative investigations. In addition to their role as "informa-
tion-gathering" agencies, these investigative committees had increas-
ingly become "information-giving" sources as well.57 That is, legislative
54. Id. at 543.
55. Id. at 552.
56. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, wrote that the Connecticut statute
would have to bear "a substantial burden of justification" to be validated, since it
was a significant intrusion into personal freedom. He further found that the state
had not shown any compelling reason to invade that freedom, and thus that the statute
deprived couples of liberty without due process of law, as required by the fourteenth
amendment. 381 U.S. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring).
57. See Comment, Watkins v. United States, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 272, 273 (1957).
JUNE 1974]
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committees no longer sought information merely to aid the drafting
of informed legislation, but, in many instances, published such data so
freely that it produced exposure for exposure's sake.58
The foremost employers of this exposure policy on the national
level were the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) during their investi-
gations into subversion in such sensitive areas as education, the media,
and various political organizations. On the state level, the primary
targets were various branches of 'the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the southern states.
At both levels, compulsory testimony before legislative investigating
committees yielded information which was thrust into the glaring light
of media publicity. Frequently, this unwelcomed media attention re-
sulted in full exposure of the unpopular political activities and beliefs
of individuals and groups. Repeatedly, this public exposure culminated
in public ridicule, loss of employment, destruction of friendships,
opprobrium, and even danger of physical injury.
On the national level, the principal method of protecting oneself
from such public disclosure and displeasure was the invocation of the
fifth amendment. Many of those who claimed the privilege were not
apprehensive of possible criminal prosecution, but rather were fearful
that in the wake of exposure their freedoms of political belief and
association would be severely curtailed through public pressure.59
Others simply believed that such a public probing of individual and
group beliefs involved an unwarranted invasion of free conscience,
belief, and sanctity of mind - the very type of action the Supreme
Court had seemed to deny the government in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette.60 In Barnette, Justice Jackson had poign-
antly written:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics ... or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
58. See Carr, Investigations in Operation: The Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, 18 U. CHi. L. REv. 598, 599 (1951), where the author, in discussing the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, states:
[A]lways its interest in public opinion has been paramount. The Committee has
been concerned lest the American people fail to share its understanding of the
nature of subversive activity and the many forms it may take, or appreciate the
seriousness of the threat offered by this activity to the "American Way of life"
as seen by itself.
Id. at 599.
59. See Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L.
REv. 337, 362-69 (1953).
60. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
[VOL. 19: p. 833
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any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.6'
Some of those deeply concerned with the adverse implications of such
invasions of privacy for the freedom of political belief nevertheless
refused to imbrue themselves with the stigma attached to an invocation
of the fifth amendment. Instead, during the McCarthy period, they
turned to the first amendment's protection of free speech and association,
believing that if preferred freedoms were real, privacy of conscience
certainly would be protected from unwarranted legislative intrusion.
The first amendment defense initially made its appearance in a
series of lower federal court decisions in the late 1940's.2 The factual
backgrounds of the cases were strikingly similar: HCUA investigative
committees questioning alleged subversives regarding their past and
present political beliefs and associations, a refusal by the witnesses
to answer the inquiries based upon first amendment immunity and
prompt citation for contempt. In passing upon the legitimacy of
these contempt citations, the courts uniformly upheld the authority of
Congress to require answers to such questions. A variety of rationali-
zations were offered, but the most basic reason justifying denial of
the first amendment defense was simply that Congress had a right to
inform itself about potential Communist subversion." The additional
fact that these investigations might touch upon areas involving free
speech was not considered a sufficient reason to restrict the power to
investigate. 4 The courts obviously thought that the first amendment
could be amply protected should Congress attempt to create and im-
plement unconstitutional legislation (as distinguished from mere in-
vestigation), but that any such protection for preferred freedoms had
to await the actual passage of such detrimental statutes.65 In any
regard, the first amendment was not an absolute bar to governmental
action, as indicated by the limitations held to have been lawfully im-
posed upon obscenity, incitement to riot, and advocacy of overthrow-
ing -the government.6 Furthermore, although adverse pressures might
61. Id. at 642. As Senator Ervin has recently argued, the problem with unlimited
investigative power is "that it clashes with the fundamental constitutional principle
that what people are thinking is none of the business of government investigators. I
believe that, unchecked, the exercise of such an inherent power can quickly give this
nation the trappings of a police state." Ervin, Privacy and Government Investigation,
21 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 140 (1971).
62. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843(1948) ; United States v Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948); United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90-92 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1947).
65. See, e.g., United States v Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 63 (D.D.C. 1947).
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result from this public exposure, the acts were performed by private
individuals and were not the responsibility of Congress.67
Only rarely, in poignant dissent, was the truly destructive potential
for debilitating first amendment rights inherent in this legislative ex-
posure even recognized. Judge Charles Clark, dissenting in United
States v. Josephson s cogently reasoned that if Congress were consti-
tutionally restrained from infringing speech and belief through legis-
lation, it could not use the devices of investigation and publicity to
accomplish the same ends.6" Similar objection was registered by Judge
Henry Edgerton in Barsky v. United States :70 "That the Committee's
investigation does in fact restrict speech is too clear for dispute. The
prosecution does not deny it and the court concedes it."'71 Such in-
vestigations, aways well publicized by the media, restricted freedom
of speech by uncovering and stigmatizing the expression of unpopular
views. Furthermore, "[t]he effect is not limited to the people whom
the Committee stigmatizes or calls before it, but extends to others
who hold similar views and to still others who might be disposed to
adopt them."'7 2  Pointing to the Supreme Court's decision in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,73 Judge Edgerton indicated
that free speech included the right not to speak,74 and, echoing Judge
Clark's dissent in Josephson,7 5 he concluded: "What Congress may
not restrain, Congress may not restrain by exposure and obloquy." 6
The Supreme Court studiously avoided passing upon other than
procedural issues relating to congressional investigations until 1957. 77
That year brought the first major pronouncement on, and recognition
of, the first amendment defense, though it was largely limited to dicta."
In Watkins v. United States,"9 the Court upheld the petitioner's attack
upon an HCUA investigation where he had been called as a witness.
Watkins, a labor organizer, had refused to testify about former asso-
ciates who might have been Communist party members, and whom
67. See, e.g., Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 246-50 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
68. 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948).
69. Id. at 93.
70. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
71. Id. at 255 (Edgerton, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
72. Id.
73. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
74. 167 F.2d at 255 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
75. 165 F.2d at 93 (Clark, J., dissenting).
76. 167 F.2d at 256 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
77. See PRITCHETT, THE POLITICAL OFFENDER AND THE WARREN COURT 83-84(1958).
78. See Comment, First Amendment Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional
Investigating Committees, 7 VILL. L. REV. 84, 90-94 (1961).
79. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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he believed had long since left the party.s8 Essentially, the Court
added to its previously articulated requirement of legitimate legislative
purposes ' the further procedural requirement that all questions must
be germane to the subject under investigation. Furthermore, upon
demand by the witness, the pertinency of every question was to be
related to the purpose of the investigation.
In addition to imposing these procedural limitations, Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion included an important discussion about the
first amendment. Affirming the applicability of first amendment pro-
tections to Congressional investigations as well as to direct lawmaking,
the Chief Justice declared that "there is no Congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure."8" The Chief Justice continued:
Abuses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead
to abridgement of protected freedoms. The mere summoning of
a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about
his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of govern-
mental interference. And when those forced revelations concern
matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the
general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disas-
trous. This effect is even more harsh when it is past beliefs,
expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged by cur-
rent standards rather than those contemporary with the matters
exposed. Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences.
Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the
same glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma, scorn
and obloquy.'
The mere fact that Congress itself did not carry out the retribution
initiated by its acts of exposure "cannot relieve the investigators of
their responsibility for initiating the reaction."8 4 Such adverse public
reaction seriously inhibits freedom of communication and unpopular
political activity - basic rights protected by the first amendment.88
Yet, Warren also recognized the necessity for accommodating the
need of Congress for particular information with the individual's per-
sonal interest in privacy and unhindered political activity: "The crucial
element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest
of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness."88
80. Id. at 181-86.
81. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) ; McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927) ; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1881).
82. 354 U.S. at 200.
83. Id. at 198.
84. Id.
85. It has been asserted that such diminishing of first amendment rights results
in the very inability to reach decisions necessary for self-government. Note, Privacy
in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1468 (1973).
86. 354 U.S. at 198.
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Proper investigations must have a "clear determination by the House
or the Senate that a particular injury is justified by specific legislative
need."18 7 However, the Justice cautioned:
We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional in-
vestigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any
private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the re-
sponsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to
insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an
individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion, or assembly.88
While Chief Justice Warren's dictum showed the Court's concern
about the possible abridgement of the first amendment in legislative
investigations, his pregnant phrases about "specific legislative need"
indicated that given a legitimate purpose (as determined by the Court),
the first amendment would have to yield to public necessity. Neverthe-
less, the important aspect of the decision is that the Court "stated
explicitly that, in order to protect first amendment freedoms of in-
dividuals from unnecessary abridgement at the hands of congressional
committees, it would prohibit the use of compulsory process beyond
the point at which the congressional need for information could no
longer reasonably justify incursions into these freedoms."8 9
A more precise definition of the first amendment defense was
offered in NAACP v. Alabama °00 a case growing out of a state in-
vestigation. Alleging that the NAACP, a New York corporation, had
failed to comply with state legislation requiring the registration of
foreign corporations doing business within Alabama, the state had
secured, in a state circuit court, orders requiring the NAACP to
produce records and documents, including its state membership lists.
The NAACP complied with all elements of the court orders, except
for producing its membership registry; subsequently the Association
was held in contempt. 1
Initially, there appeared to be a considerable body of precedent
supporting the Alabama regulation. In People ex rel. Bryant v. Zim-
merman,2 the Court had upheld a New York statute requiring the
87. Id. at 205.
88. Id. at 198-99.
89. Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CINN. L.
REV. 113, 135 (1961). The Court directed a similar message to state legislative in-
vestigations in the companion case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
90. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
91. Id. at 452-54. For a general discussion of the NAACP and its fight for free
association, see H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65-121 (1965).
92. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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Ku Klux Klan to file membership statements. There, the Court had
reasoned that the state had a right to oversee associations formed
under its protection, and that such public disclosure of private informa-
tion would discourage illegal activity. 93 Yet, that case could be dis-
tinguished on the ground that the Klan was a group which most prob-
ably had engaged in some illegal activity, a characterization not true
of the NAACP. However, the Court had also upheld compulsory
registration statutes affecting lobbyists94 and foreign agents95 which
applied to all political groups equally, not just a single unpopular
organization. Nonetheless, even though all such groups might comply,
the public opprobrium would fall, naturally, only upon the unpopular
and unorthodox groups, thereby working an inequality.9"
Further distinguishing characteristics may also be noted. The
importance of alien propagandist registration during wartime, as well
as regulation of lobbyists seeking to influence federal legislation, was
so substantial that any collateral adverse effects upon freedom of asso-
ciation and belief were outweighed." The issue, therefore, with re-
spect to NAACP registration, could be phrased as whether the state
had a sufficiently vital interest to justify these inhibiting effects upon
the first amendment. Indeed, the case is similar to that of Thomas v.
Collins,9" where a Texas statute9" required union organizers to register
and identify themselves before they could address any labor meeting.
There, the Court flatly declared that any attempt to so limit free
speech must be predicated upon a showing that the subject activity
created a "clear and present danger" to the public interest:100 "Only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitations." 10 1
In its consideration of the case, the Supreme Court attributed
great weight to the NAACP's claim that this disclosure violated its
members' freedom of association as protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.102 Accordingly, in his opinion for an unanimous Court, Justice
93. Id. at 75-76. See also Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory
Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 614, 642-46 (1958).
94. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
95. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
96. See Note, State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amendment
Checks on Powers of Regulation, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 562-63 (1957).
97. See generally D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
67 (1963) ; Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Govern-
mental Intrusion into Political Affairs, 47 MICH. L. REv. 181, 213 (1948).
98. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
99. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154, § 5 (1962).
100. 323 U.S. at 530.
101. Id.
102. The Court stated: "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group associations,
as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus be-
tween the freedoms of speech and assembly." 357 U.S. at 460. For the birth and
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Harlan stated that such compulsory disclosure would abridge the
rights of the NAACP's members to engage in lawful association in
support of their common beliefs:
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of
affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as
effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of
governmental action . . . . Inviolability of privacy in group asso-
ciation may in many circumstances be indispensable to the preser-
vation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs."0 3
Such public exposure, he noted, would subject individuals so identified
to economic reprisals, loss of employment, threats of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility.'
In the section of the opinion most relevant to the first amendment
defense, Justice Harlan further clarified the intimate relationship be-
tween privacy and unhampered political activity. The fact that subse-
quent retribution was meted out not by government officials but by
private individuals did not excuse the original intrusion.' Rather,
"[t]he crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private
action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented
by the producton order that private action takes hold."' 0 6 If any such
disclosure was to take place, the subordinating interest of the state must
be compelling.' °7 The Court found little connection between the osten-
sible purpose of the registration statute and the order that membership
lists be provided. Furthermore, "whatever interest the State may have
in obtaining names of ordinary members has not been shown to be
sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the pro-
duction order."'' 0 Consequently, the first amendment defense could have
been overcome only if a sufficiently compelling interest had been demon-
strated; failing that, the balance swung to the side of individual rights.
The next major Supreme Court decision involving the first amend-
ment defense made it quite evident that the Court had adopted a bal-
ancing perspective, pitting the rights of the individual against the
evolution of free association under the first amendment, see Abernathy, The Right of
Association, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32 (1953); Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 1361 (1963) ; Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,
74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964) ; Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HASTINGS
L.J. 491 (1965); Wyzanski, The Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry into
Freedom of Association, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 336 (1947) ; Comment, Freedom of Asso-
ciation: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. REV. 730 (1960).
103. 357 U.S. at 462.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 463.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 465-66.
108. Id. at 465.
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needs of society. °9 Barenblatt v. United States.. involved a situation
highly analogous to that in Watkins v. United States,"' although the
subject matter was subversion in education rather than in labor. The
issue was whether inquiry into past or present membership in the
Communist Party transgressed the limitations of the first amendment.
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, began the opinion by dis-
tinguishing a claim based upon the fifth amendment from one anchored
in the first. The former claim was absolute in nature,1 12 as it gave a
witness the means to resist inquiry in all circumstances in wlich the
"witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
answer."" 3 However, the language of the first amendment, although
drafted in at least equally absolute terms, was held susceptible to a
more restricted application:
Undeniably, the first amendment in some circumstances protects
an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational
relationships. However, the protections of the First Amendment,
unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment, do not afford a witness the right to
resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where First Amendment
rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private
and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.
These principles were recognized in the Watkins case, where, in
speaking of the First Amendment in relation to congressional
inquiries, we said . . . "The crucial element is the existence of,
and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in
demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness.""'
Justice Harlan found that Congress had "wide power to legislate
in the field of Communist activity in this country,"' 5 for national self-
109. For a view that this choice was an unfortunate one not intended by the original
drafters, see McKay, Congressional Investigations and the Supreme Court, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 267 (1963), where the author states:
Indeed, the real truth seems to be that, if the balancing test is applied, the first
amendment is drained of all meaning except to sa-, tnat government should not
act unreasonably. But surely it was not the original intent that the first amend-
ment should rnean nothing different than the due process protection against arbi-
trary and unr asonable governmental action.
Id. at 281. On the merits and disadvantages of the balancing approach, see Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the
Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
821 (1962).
110. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
111. 354 U.S. 17j (1957). See notes 79-89 and accompanying text supra.
112. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). For further discussion, see Redlich, Rights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees: Effects of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1126, 1127-36 (1961).
113. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
114. 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959).
115. Id. at 127.
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preservation was involved, and consequently it had authority to in-
vestigate for this purpose. Therefore, even though Barenblatt involved
a teacher and his lectures, Justice Harlan concluded that where "in-
vestigation of advocacy or preparation for overthrow" are proper
topics of an investigation, there is a right to identify a witness as a
member of the Communist Party." 6
Perhaps even more significant was the Court's refusal to sanction
an attack against the investigation's validity on the basis that its motive
was simply to expose, a major point relied upon in Watkins:
So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power,
the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the
motives which spurred the exercise of that power .... The remedy
for this [exposure], however, lies not in the abuse by the judicial
authority of its functions, but in the people, upon whom, after
all, under our institutions, reliance must be placed for the correc-
tion of abuses committed in the exercise of lawful power."'
Therefore, given a legitimate legislative purpose and a subject matter
of significant public importance, the balance will usually be struck in
the government's favor, and, accordingly the provisions of the first
amendment will not be offended."' For the dissenting Justices Black
and Douglas, however, any restriction of the first amendment, without
a nexus in preventing illegal action, was a direct infringement of the
amendment's intended absolute protection." 9
In several cases arising from the operation of state investigative
statutes, the Supreme Court also recognized broad authority to in-
vestigate subversion, while moving to protect other forms of political
privacy. In Uphaus v. Wyman,120 plaintiff, in the course of a state
investigation into subversive activities, refused to provide a list of
persons who had attended a "World Fellowship" camp at which he
had been a director. For Mr. Justice Clark, the state had justification
to believe these persons at the camp were subversives within the mean-
ing of New Hampshire law,' 2 ' and the investigation, therefore, was
undertaken as part of the state's right of "self-preservation," the ulti-
mate value for any society. 12 2 Consequently, Justice Clark found that
116. Id. at 129-30.
117. Id. at 132-33.
118. Id. at 134.
119. Id. (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting). For a sharp criticism of Baren-
blatt, see Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CINN.
L. REv. 113 (1961).
120. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
121. Id. at 78-79, citing N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN. §§588:1-16 (1955).
122. Id. at 81, quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). Justice
Clark went to some effort to justify the existence of New Hampshire's subversion
statute, in light of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). In Nelson, the
conviction of petitioner under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act was overturned on the
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"[t] his governmental interest outweighs individual rights in an asso-
ciational privacy which, however real in other circumstances ...were
here tenous at best.' 23
However, in an analogous situation, when the NAACP sought
to prevent forced disclosure of its membership list as part of Little
Rock, Arkansas' occupational license tax ordinance, the Court has-
tened to reaffirm its holding in NAACP v. Alabama2 4 since the city
was not able to demonstrate an interest of sufficient magnitude to limit
the freedom of association. 125 Thus the Court found no direct relation-
ship between the possession of the membership lists and the securing
of the information necessary to levy the tax.
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided two additional cases which
further indicated that the delicate balance between privacy and dis-
closure would not always be struck in favor of government. In Talley
v. California,a26 Los Angeles had passed an ordinance making it a
criminal offense to circulate handbills unless the names and addresses
of those who prepared and distributed them were included. 27 The
interest the city posited to justify the regulation was its need to combat
fraud, false advertising, and libel.' 28 The Court weighed this interest
against the crucial role that anonymous publication had played in pro-
moting unhampered political discussion. From the outset, the Court
clearly dispelled the idea that anonymity of publication was incon-
sistent with constructive purpose. As Justice Black wrote:
There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement
would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and there-
by freedom of expression. "Liberty of circulating is as essential
to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the cir-
culation, the publication would be of little value.""2 9
Referring to NAACP cases, Justice Black further declared: "The rea-
son for those holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.
This broad Los Angeles ordinance is subject to the same infirmity."' 130
ground that the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), superseded it. Id. at 500-20.
In Uphaus, Justice Clark expressed the view that Nelson was inapposite, for two
reasons: first, Nelson involved a state prosecution, whereas in the instant case the
state was conducting only a legislative inquiry; second, Nelson was held only to
foreclose a state prosecution for sedition against the federal government; a state
could still prosecute seditions against itself. 360 U.S. at 76-77.
123. 360 U.S. at 80.
124. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See notes 90-108 and accompanying text supra.
125. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-27 (1960).
126. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
127. Id. at 60-61.
128. Id. at 64.
129. Id., quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
130. 362 U.S. at 65. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1102-03 (1961).
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In the second case, Shelton v. Tucker, 3' an Arkansas statute re-
quired, as a condition of employment, that every public school teacher
annually file an affidavit listing the organizations to which he or she
had belonged or regularly contributed within the previous five years.13 2
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, evidenced a concern
with the community pressures that could be applied against teachers
belonging to unpopular political groups. Not only might they be sub-
ject to harassment, but public pressure might compel local school
boards to terminate their contracts.
It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every
associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free associa-
tion, a right closely allied to freedom of speech, and a right which,
like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.13
While it cannot be disputed that a school board has a legitimate interest
in factors that bear upon a teacher's competence, including relevant asso-
ciations, this particular statute was far too broad and comprehensive to
justify sustaining it against the significant individual rights involved.
However, in those cases where the Communist Party was ex-
plicitly involved, the Court continued to balance the scale of conflicting
rights in favor of the government. For example, in Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Board,' the party had been directed
to register as a subversive organization under the Subversive Activities
Control Act.' A portion of the Subversive Activities Control Board's
order required the party to provide a membership list. While Justice
Frankfurter's opinion frankly acknowledged the limitation upon the
first amendment inherent in such an order, he concluded that compet-
ing considerations tipped the scales in favor of the government," 6
because in this type of case the need of society to protect itself against
subversion became paramount. In contrast with the NAACP caseS137
and Shelton v. Tucker, 38 the membership list in this situation had a
direct relationship to a legitimate need of government. Any resulting
opprobrium and obloquy were necessary costs to strip away the ano-
nymity which, while protecting Communists from popular prejudice,
131. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See Bendich, First Amendment Standards for Con-
gressional Investigations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1963).
132. 364 U.S. at 480. No. 10, §§ 2-5, [1958] Ark. Acts 2d Ex. Sess. 2018 (de-
clared unconstitutional by Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)).
133. 364 U.S. at 485-86. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
134. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
135. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 7, 64 Stat. 993.
136. Id. at 4-8.
137. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
516 (1960). See notes 90-108 and accompanying text supra.
138. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See notes 133-34 and accompanying text supra.
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also allowed the party to carry out the plans of a "foreign-directed
conspiracy.' 0
This dual standard the Court had developed in deciding first
amendment claims of the right to political anonymity, whereby the
claim would be rejected if the organization were Communist, met an
interesting test in 1963. The case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee,4 ° involved both the key elements of the
NAACP and an investigation into subversion. Gibson, the president
of the Miami Beach branch of the NAACP, was called before a state
investigating committee to answer questions relating to Communist
infiltration into civil rights organizations. 4' He refused to produce
NAACP records, declaring that exposure of the membership list would
be a serious infringement upon the members' right to free association.14 2
Justice Goldberg's opinion began by noting that both sides agreed
the key issue was whether there existed a "substantial relation between
the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest."' 43 That is, was there a "nexus" between the Miami Beach
branch and any Communist activity? In order to clarify this question,
he distinguished the line of cases beginning with Uphaus v. Wyman""
which had upheld a broad power to investigate subversion. He stated
that, in those cases, the witnesses had refused to answer questions
about their own past or present membership in the Communist Party.
In contrast, Gibson was not suspected of being a Communist; rather,
it was the association which was the subject of the investigation. Yet,
the record did not suggest that the NAACP, or even this branch, was
a subversive organization; in fact, both the national and local associa-
tions had taken steps to eliminate any such individuals from leadership
positions.'45 Consequently, concluded Justice Goldberg, the questions
which Gibson refused to answer were not about membership in any
Communist agency, but rather concerned a legitimate and nonsub-
versive group.
This was, therefore, a very different situation from those in
the leading cases on investigating subversion. As Justice Goldberg
explained:
The prior holdings that governmental interest in controlling sub-
version and the particular character of the Communist Party and
139. 364 U.S. at 102-03.
140. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
141. Id. at 541-43.
142. Id. at 542-43.
143. Id. at 546.
144. 360 U.S. 72. See notes 120-23 and accompanying text supra.
145. 372 U.S. at 548.
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its objectives outweigh the right of individual Communists to
conceal party membership or affiliations by no means require the
wholly different conclusion that other groups -c oncededly legiti-
mate - automatically forfeit their rights to privacy of associa-
tion simply because the general subject matter of the legislative
inquiry is Communist subversion or infiltraiton. 46
Furthermore, since there was no evidence from the record that there
existed a "substantial connection" between any Communist subversion
and the Miami Beach branch, a factor which the committee itself ac-
knowledged to be a necessary prerequisite for any such investigation,
the state had failed to demonstrate "the immediate, substantial, and
subordinating state interest necessary to sustain its right of inquiry
into the membership lists of the association." '4 7 Without meeting this
threshold requirement, there was no justification for demanding the
membership lists of a nonsubversive association;4" otherwise, the
rights guaranteed by the first amendment would be jeopardized and
weakened without sufficient justification.'49 For several Justices,'5"
however, there was no difference in state interest between Communist
infiltration of organizations and Communist activity by organizations.' 5 '
The most recent Supreme Court case on this point, De Gregory
v. New Hampshire,5 ' also involved a state investigation into subver-
sion. A 1963 investigation asked De Gregory about his alleged Com-
munist activities prior to 1957. He refused to answer upon first amend-
ment grounds, but indicated that he had no knowledge of any Com-
munist activities after 1957.' Speaking for the majority, Justice
Douglas stated that "the staleness of both the basis for the investiga-
tion and its subject matter makes indefensible such exposure of one's
146. Id. at 549.
147. Id. at 551.
148. Id. at 557.
149. Id. at 546.
150. In addition to joining with Justice Goldberg's majority opinion, Justices Black
and Douglas each concurred separately. Id. at 558, 559. Justice White joined in the
dissent of Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, and in addition dissented separately.
Id. at 576, 583.
151. Id. at 558-85. However, each Justice expressed individual reasons for not
making this distinction. Justice Black's concurring opinion expressed the view that
the right of association extended just as fully to Communists as any other group.
Id. at 558-59 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Douglas concurred on the ground that
the "government is not only powerless to legislate with respect to membership in a
lawful organization; it is also precluded from probing . . . such . . . groups that
exist in this country, regardless of the legislative purpose sought to be served." Id.
at 565 (Douglas, J., concurring). The dissent of Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart,
and White expresses the opinion that the investigation was properly within the
Committee's interest in discovering evidence of subversive activities, even if the par-
ticular organization investigated was not itself subversive. Id. at 576-83 (Harlan,
Clark, Stewart, and White, JJ., dissenting). Justice White dissented separately,
deploring the barriers he felt this holding erected to stemming the spread of Com-
munist subversion. Id. at 583-85 (White, J., dissenting).
152. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
153. Id. at 826-28.
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associational and political past - exposure which is objectionable and
damaging in the extreme to one whose associations and political views
do not command majority approval.' 1 5 4 The first amendment cannot
be infringed unless there is an overwhelming public necessity to do so.
Certainly in the Gibson sense, no nexus existed here to justify the in-
vasion of privacy. Justice Douglas, therefore, concluded that the state's
interest was "too remote and conjectural to override the guarantee
of the First Amendment that a person can speak or not, as he chooses,
free of all governmental compulsion.' 15-
Several dimensions of the first amendment defense become evi-
dent from the foregoing analysis of the doctrine's evolution. First, it
would seem obvious that the primary claim under the first amendment
is not basically one of invasion of personal conscience. Rather, the
primary rationale is that consequences can stem from compulsory dis-
closure of political belief and association so adversely as to inhibit the
full employment of free speech. 5 ' As the Court stated in Louisiana
v. NAACP,' "where it is shown . . . that disclosure of membership
results in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is
not required."'1 5 8 Second, as long as the Court adheres to this "balanc-
ing test," even if narrowly construed as it was in Gibson and De
Gregory, the defense can never really protect members of admittedly
subversive groups. However, nonsubversive associations such as the
NAACP, even though on occasion controversial, apparently can make
effective use of the first amendment defense.' 9
154. Id. at 828-29 (footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 830.
156. In order to successfully argue the "chilling effect" of governmental investiga-
tions, it must be demonstrated that individuals or groups have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
13 (1972), dealing with military intelligence surveillance of civilian political activity
to assist in controlling possible civil disorders.
157. 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
158. Id. at 296.
159. A possible alternative to limiting investigative jurisdiction was indicated in
the recent decision of Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970). The
House Committee on Internal Security was preparing to release a report identifying
65 college campus speakers who allegedly were "New Left" revolutionaries. Before
the committee report could be officially released, an injunction, based upon first amend-
ment grounds of free speech and association, was sought to enjoin the committee
members, Public Printer, and Superintendent of Documents from releasing the in-
formation. The court concluded that such a report would be a political "blacklist"
designed to discourage invitations for future speaking engagements. 318 F. Supp.
at 1182. The court, however, disclaimed any power to enjoin members of the com-
mittee from discussing the contents of the report on the floor of Congress, nor did it
feel the judiciary had authority to prohibit reproducing the report in the Congressional
Record. The court did, however, enjoin the Public Printer from printing and dis-
tributing the report. Id. See Clark and Stites, The First Amendment: Congressional
Investigations and the Speech or Debate Clause, 40 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 108 (1971).
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: CORE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
The most crucial provision of the Constitution protecting privacy,
and the one most persistently identified with the concept, is the fourth
amendment.' This fundamental ban upon "unreasonable" searches
and seizures is based upon the premise that to breach the privacy of
the individual is an extraordinary action; one that requires a number
of safeguards to be satisfied before it can be undertaken."6 While a
general analysis of the Supreme Court's construction of the amendment
is beyond the scope of this article, some persistent trends nonetheless
can be indicated and discussed.
According to Jacob W. Landynski, the Supreme Court has had
several options in interpreting the amendment. Noting that nowhere
within the amendment is the term "unreasonable" defined, he has argued
that there are three possible interpretations of the relationship between
the fundamental clauses which compose the text of the amendment :162
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant
requirements specified in the second clause; (2) that the first
clause provides an additional restriction by implying that some
searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible, even
when made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause provides an
additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find some
searches "reasonable" even when carried out without warrant. 6
He suggests that the first part of the amendment's text "recognized
as already existing a right to freedom from arbitrary governmental in-
vasion of privacy and did not seek to create and confer such a right."' 64
The first clause was designed to emphasize the importance of fulfilling
the procedural requirements specified in the second clause. While "the
second clause, in turn, defines and interprets the first, telling us the
160. See note 162 infra.
161. The requirement that (in the absence of exigent circumstances) a judicially
authorized warrant must be obtained where practicable, is the most fundamental pro-
cedure designed to limit governmental intrusions into privacy. See, e.g., Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
162. The text of the amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
163. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKI]. For a concise treatment of the amendment's
English antecedents, drafting, and early interpretation, see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION (1937).
164. LANDYNSKI, supra note 163, at 43.
[VOL. 19: p. 833
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 6 [1974], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/1
PENUMBRAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
kind of search that is not 'unreasonable,' and therefore not forbidden,
namely, the one carried out under the safeguards there specified."' 65
Under this thesis, the first and second alternatives are in accord with
the intended purpose of the amendment, though Landynski prefers
the second.' 66
It is significant to note that from the Court's earliest interpreta-
tions of the amendment in the 1880's, it has chosen explicitly to link
the concept of privacy to the fourth amendment. This is clearly indi-
cated in the early case of Boyd v. United States,6 7 which has proved
to be one of the most significant pronouncements on the fourth amend-
ment ever made. The case centered around the Federal Customs Reve-
nue Act of 1874.16 The pertinent section of the statute provided that,
upon proper notice from a court, a defendant in fraud proceedings
could be required to produce in court specified papers and documents
of importance in the litigation. If the defendant failed to produce such
papers, then the allegations made against him were to be considered
confessed and affirmed. Obviously, a defendant under these conditions
had little choice but to produce the requested papers.
In striking down this provision, Justice Bradley relied heavily
upon English precedent on search and seizure, with particular emphasis
upon the case of Entick v. Carrington.'69 He believed Lord Camden's
decision in this case to be one of the "landmarks of English liberty,' 71 7
and to have been an important influence upon the framers of the Bill of
Rights.' 7' For Justice Bradley, the principles laid down in that case
were "the very essence of constitutional liberty and security,' 17 2 and
should not have been confined to the concrete facts of a physical in-
vasion of a home and the carting away of private papers. He stated
that these principles
apply to all invasions, on 'the part of the government and its em-
ployees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitute the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-
feited by his conviction of some public offense - it is the invasion
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
168. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 5, 18 Stat. 187.
169. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
170. 116 U.S. at 626.
171. Id. at 626-30. See Trimble, Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amend-
ment as Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 41 KENT L.J. 196, 200 (1953).
172. 116 U.S. at 630.
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of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence
of Lord Camden's judgment.'
And then, in the key clause of the opinion, in a statement that would
lead to decades of controversy, Justice Bradley asserted:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are cir-
cumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory ex-
tortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
174
Justice Bradley thus drew several vital conclusions about the
fourth amendment. First, he construed the intent and spirit of the
amendment to be the protection of an individual's rights to privacy
and security. Second, Bradley anticipated the troublesome "mere evi-
dence rule": while the government had a superior interest which
entitled it to seize the instrumentalities of a crime, the fruits of crime
or contraband, it could never have a legitimate claim upon one's private
papers as evidence of crime only. Third, he stressed the interrelation-
ship of the fourth and fifth amendments, an interpretation similar to
Landynski's second thesis.175 He stated -that "the 'unreasonable searches
and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always
made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment."' 76 Therefore, such a procedure compelling the production of
papers was inherently unreasonable in that it actually forced an in-
dividual to be a witness against himself. As a result, the presumption
lay that certain types of searches were precluded even with a fully
authorized search warrant.'77
During the long and complex development of ,the amendment from
the 1880's to the present, the Court never fundamentally deviated from
Justice Bradley's original emphasis upon privacy. A number of cases
in the late 1940's made frequent references to privacy and even to the
developing interchangeability of the terms "privacy" and "fourth
amendment.' 7 8 A significant decision in this regard was McDonald
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
176. 116 U.S. at 633.
177. An interesting, but critical, analysis of this case is found in Nelson, Search
and Seizure: Boyd v. United States, 9 Am. B. Ass'N J. 773 (1923).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) ; United States v.
Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
78-79 (1949); Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946).
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v. United States.7 9 In that case, the police were suspicious that gam-
bling was taking place in a hotel room. They surreptitously entered
the building through an open window and, employing an open transom,
observed gambling underway in an adjacent room. 8° Immediately,
without a warrant, they arrested the gamblers and seized the para-
phernalia as evidence.' In rebuking this procedure, Justice Douglas
produced an important analysis of the relationship between the fourth
amendment and privacy:
This guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike. It marks the
right of privacy as one of the unique values of our civilization and,
with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police unless they have
a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation.
18 2
Later, Justice Douglas continued:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor
to make the home a safe place for illegal activities. It was done
so that an objective mind might weigh the' need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was
deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose
job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power
is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their
own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magis-
trate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the
privacy of the home. 83
Douglas insisted that in this situation a warrant should have been
obtained, since it was obviously not an emergency: "We cannot allow
the constitutional barrier that protects the privacy of the individual to
be hurdled so easily.' 1 84
A most potent conception of privacy and its significance for a
democratic society was contained in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion
in Brinegar v. United States.185 The majority had upheld the validity
of the warrantless search of an automobile, on the ground that there
was probable cause for the search. But Justice Jackson, former prose-
179. 335 U.S. 451 (1948). See generally Magill, Toward a More Liberal Con-
struction of the Fourth Amendment, 27 DICTA 13, 21-22 (1950).
180. 335 U.S. at 452-53.
181. Id. at 453.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 455-56.
184. Id. at 455.
185. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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cutor at Nuremberg, detailed an argument for the importance of
privacy with a poignancy that few opinions can match:
These, I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong
in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of
rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Un-
controlled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one
needs only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people pos-
sessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-
reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are sub-
ject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.' 86
Obviously for Jackson, privacy was not merely a sociological or phi-
losophical concept, but something acutely necessary for democracy
to function.
Several post-Griswold decisions have further indicated the extent
to which the Supreme Court has recognized privacy as the central
value protected by the fourth amendment. 18 7
A. The Mere Evidence Rule
In 1967, the Supreme Court rejected the "mere evidence" exclu-
sionary rule. The rule had its explicit establishment in the 1921 case
of Gouled v. United States,' where it was determined that objects of
"evidentiary value only" could never be lawfully seized.' 89 While the
Court believed that society had a greater proprietary interest pertain-
ing to the implements of crime, its fruits, and contraband, the de-
fendant's interest in his papers and other chattels exclusive of these
categories could not be overcome simply because the government
wished to use them as- evidence. 90 This rule would seem to comply
with Landynski's second thesis'.' in its interpretation of the fourth
amendment: certain categories of searches are unreasonable irrespec-
tive of any warrant. Thus, "[i]t is arguable that the drafters of the
Constitution intended to further protect a man's privacy by immunizing
from seizure certain of his personal property."' 92 In other words, just
186. Id. at 180-81 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also notes 219-32
and accompanying text infra.
188. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
189. Id. at 309-13.
190. Id. at 310. See Rintalla, The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure
Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2099 (1966).
191. See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
192. Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in Search
of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 319, 327 (1953).
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as the exclusionary rule discouraged illegal searches by denying their
fruits, the mere evidence limitation discouraged the breach of individual
privacy by limiting the types of evidence that could be seized.
93
In Warden v. Hayden, 9 the Court stripped away this protection
from all but the testimonial and communicative types of evidence.' 95
The Court allowed state police to seize any tangible property, in this
case clothing, and to utilize it as evidence in a robbery prosecution. 9
It was interesting to note that in the process of distinguishing earlier
precedent, the Court chose to speak to the heart of the fourth amend-
ment's protection. Justice Brennan stated:
We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on
property concepts . . . . This shift in emphasis from property to
privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive
and procedural reform.
19 7
Since privacy was equally invaded by warranted searches for "mere
evidence" as by seizure of traditional categories of evidence, the dis-
tinction based upon who had a greater property interest could not
stand. '9 The seizure of clothing was no greater invasion of privacy
than the seizure of a gun.' 99 However, it was important to bear in
mind that communicative evidence, such as private papers, which un-
der the Boyd rationale also received the protection of the fifth amend-
ment, could still be excluded at trial. ° °
Justice Douglas' dissent was significant in several regards. Of
particular interest was his definition of privacy:
Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to
reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses ...
The existence of that choice is the very essence of the right of
privacy . . . . That dual aspect of privacy means that the indi-
vidual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and
circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and de-
cide the extent of that sharing.2"'
193. See United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (1930).
194. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
195. Evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature is objectionable on fifth
amendment grounds; the question of its evidentiary value is never reached. Id.
at 302-03.
196. Id. at 297-98.
197. Id. at 304.
198. Id. at 303-04.
199. Id. at 306-08.
200. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886). See Shiffrin, The Search
and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 Loy.
L.A. L. Rnv. 275, 287 (1973). See notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra.
201. 387 U.S. at 294, 323, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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A second important aspect of Douglas' dissent was its relationship to
his opinion in Griswold.2"2 In Griswold, Douglas had postulated a
"zone of privacy" composed of various emanations from the different
Bill of Rights guarantees. 20 1 In Hayden, Douglas spoke of two zones
of privacy, one created by the first amendment and another created by
the fourth amendment. Of the two, he felt the fourth amendment
offered a much broader protection for privacy.204
B. Electronic Surveillance
It was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court seriously began
to control the invasion of privacy accomplished by "bugging" and
wiretapping. The Court recognized that existing law had simply not
kept pace with the incessant advance of technology; privacy had fallen
into second-class consideration. This process began with Berger v.
New York, 2°5 where the Court voided a New York statute" 6 which
specified that judges could issue ex parte orders for electronic eaves-
dropping, provided a police officer or prosecutor supplied an "oath or
affirmation" stating that there was a "reasonable" ground to "believe
that evidence of crime [might] thus be obtained."2 7 An exact de-
scription was required of the person or persons whose communica-
tions were to be intercepted. The resulting order was to specify the
duration of the eavesdrop, and was limited to a 2-month period, unless
renewed. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, agreed that the
portion of the statute requiring a detached judicial authorization com-
ported with the fourth amendment. 0 ' However, he found insufficient
the lack of particularization required to secure an order - there was
no specificity as to the supposed crime, the locus of the crime, or the
things to be seized.20 9 These deficiencies were of particular import-
ance, since "eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is
broad in scope. '210 In addition, the 2-month provision allowed a con-
tinuous "roving commission" to seize any and all conversations upon
a single showing of a reasonable ground,211 since, with the mere dem-
onstration of a "public interest," the warrant could be extended an-
other 2 months. 212 Furthermore, no notice was given to those whose
202. See notes 10-17 and 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
203. 381 U.S. at 485.
204. 387 U.S. at 222 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
205. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
206. Law of April 12, 1958, ch. 676, § 813-a [1958] Laws of N.Y. 786.
207. 388 U.S. at 54.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 54-56.
210. Id. at 56.
211. Id. at 59.
212. Id. 30
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conversations were seized, and there was no provision for return of
the warrant to the issuing magistrate.218
With its decision 6 years earlier in Silverman v. United States,214
the Court had recognized that conversations were protected by the
fourth amendment. Consequently, New York's scheme had to be
evaluated in comparison with the standards necessary for a constitu-
tional warrant. Accordingly, Clark detailed a suggested list of "pre-
cise and discriminate" procedures necessary for the procurement of a
valid warrant. First, the court order had to describe with particularity
the type of conversation sought. Once the desired conversation was
seized, the authorization expired.215 Precise detail was necessary to
prevent encroachment into unauthorized areas. Second, the warrant
would only issue for one limited intrusion; it could not become a con-
tinuous authorization to seize for months at a time. 21 '6 Third, for the
warrant to be renewed, probable cause had to be demonstrated anew.
217
Finally, the officer had to make a return on the authorization indicat-
ing what items were seized and in what manner.218 In this way, no
greater invasion of privacy would be permitted than what was neces-
sary under the particular circumstances. By comparison, the indiscrimi-
nate and open-ended New York procedure was condemned. Although
the suggested procedure required much more effort on the part of
governmental authorities and perhaps narrowed the potential useful-
ness of eavesdropping devices, it maintained the fourth amendment's
dictate that independent judges alone are invested with the power to
authorize and structure governmental intrusions into privacy.
The Court continued its delineation of the requirements for elec-
tronic eavesdropping in Katz v. United States.2 9 Katz was convicted
of interstate transmission of gambling information, largely upon evi-
dence secured from a telephone booth bugged from the outside. The
issue, therefore, was whether or not it was valid to bug the booth
without a warrant, even though no physical penetration of the booth
had taken place. Justice Stewart began by flatly declaring that the
fourth amendment could not "be translated into a general constitu-
tional right to privacy. "220 While the amendment did protect the
individual and his privacy against certain types of governmental in-
trusion, its protections often had little or no relation to privacy per
213. Id. at 60.
214. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
215. 388 U.S. at 56-57.
216. Id. at 57.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
220. Id. at 350.
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se.2 2' Similarly, other provisions of the Constitution - the first, third,
and fifth amendments - protected other aspects of privacy. However,
"the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his right to
be let alone by other people - is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual states."22
Turning to the fourth amendment issue itself, Stewart dispelled
the idea that the locus of activity determines the extent of privacy,
thereby rejecting the former "constitutionally protected area ' 22 3 argu-
ment. This theory was misguided since:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 24
The mere fact that Katz used a public telephone booth did not result
in an automatic waiver of his right to privacy. 225 He had justifiably
assumed that what he had said into the mouthpiece of the telephone
would not be "broadcast to the world. '226 This was the same presump-
tion he might make in using a telephone in his own home or office.
Hence, the correct questions were: "For what purpose was the area
being used? Was the individual reasonable in relying on the fact that
his activities would remain private ?,,221
Furthermore, the Court finally disposed of the physical tres-
pass concept, stating that the end result and not the method was the
key factor:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violate the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constitute a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 350-51 (footnote omitted). The tenth amendment gives the state broad
authority to enact laws. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See New State Ice v. Lieberman,
285 U.S. 262, 302-03 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
223. In eavesdropping and wiretapping cases prior to Katz, the Supreme Court
often had viewed as controlling the question of whether the governmental intrusion
was trespassory. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; note 214
supra. See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Since a trespassory intrusion was only possible in an
area where the defendant had a property interest, the view developed that the home,
office, etc., were "constitutionally protected areas," so that if the government con-
ducted an illegal electronic eavesdrop on the premises, the protection of the fourth
amendment applied. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961). As
noted in the text, the Court in Katz specifically declined to adopt an "area" theory of
fourth amendment protection involving wiretaps. 389 U.S. at 351-55.
224. 389 U.S. at 352.
225. Id. at 351-52.
226. Id. at 352.
227. Hendricks, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and the Law of Search and Seizure -
Some Implications of the Katz Decision, 9 ARIZ. L. REV. 428, 434 (1968).
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Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device em-
ployed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall
of the booth can have no constitutional significance. 2
Hence, the test for constitutionally protected privacy became "not
whether there was physical trespass or whether the petitioner was in
a constitutionally protected area, but whether petitioner intended to
keep the seized evidence private or not. '229
Consequently, the rule seemed to be that where a person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, a valid warrant was necessary in
order to seize his words just as it would be to seize any other piece
of evidence. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. '2 30 Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz expanded on this notion.231
Harlan concluded that if the place where the conversation occurred
was one generally recognized as possessing a reasonable presumption
of privacy, and the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy,
then the presumption would 'be sound.2 32
One interesting question that has arisen out of the Berger and
Katz decisions relates to wiretapping: Is the Court now saying that
telephones can be tapped only as long as warrants are obtained?
In Olnstead v. United States, 233 the Court had excluded wiretaps
from fourth amendment protection, however, the premises on which
that decision was based seem to have been subsequently overruled.
First, in Berger, the Court reaffirmed its position from Silverman v.
United States,23 4 that the seizure of words, just like tangible evidence,
is protected by the fourth amendment. Second, as a result of Katz,
228. 389 U.S. at 357. See generally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of
the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133.
229. Comment, Constitutional Law - Right of Privacy - The Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 14 Loy. L. REV. 370, 371 (1967-68).
230. 389 U.S. at 359.
231. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 361. Ironically, Justice Black's dissent indicated the extent to which
he felt the Court had recast the fourth amendment in terms of protective privacy.
The Justice wrote: "With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting
of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring
incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable
searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy." Id. at 373 (Black,
J., dissenting).
233. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See W. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL (1965), for
an elaborate treatment of the decision. In his dissent in this case, Justice Brandeis
indicated his belief that the fourth amendment was designed to protect privacy and
must expand in scope to keep pace with the challenges to privacy resulting from new
technology. "They [the founders] recognized the significance of man's spirtual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. . . . They conferred, as against government, the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment." 277 U.S. at 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
234. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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the former requirement of physical trespass into a constitutionally
protected area has been discarded. 235  Instead, a new test, centering
around privacy, has been created: (1) Did the individual exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy? and (2) was this expectation one
that society would agree was reasonable ?236 Absent exigent circum-
stances, if these conditions are met, the only constitutional method
whereby an individual's privacy can be invaded is by search warrant.23 7
In addition, the presumption that wiretapping is now valid, given a
proper warrant, is supported by a recent decision where, in a domestic
security matter, the Court disallowed wiretaps undertaken without
prior judicial approval.2 38
C. Administrative Searches
One of the most important dimensions of fourth amendment pro-
tection for privacy involves determining whether the scope of the
amendment is confined to criminal searches. For a long period of time,
the Court had maintained that potential criminal liability had to be
involved before the fourth amendment could be invoked. This narrow
perspective was very apparent in the Court's handling of administra-
tive searches and inspections. 239 The initial consideration of the issue
by the Supreme Court proved adverse to the right of privacy. In
Frank v. Maryland,24 ° the Court seemed to declare squarely that the
fourth amendment only limited governmental intrusions for the pur-
pose of securing criminal evidence. An inspector from the Baltimore
health department was denied access to Frank's house to make a rodent
235. 389 U.S. at 350-52.
236. Interestingly, this Katz test was recently employed to vitiate the domestic
reporting provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970). Stark
v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom, California Bankers
Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See Comment, Bank Secrecy Act - Threat to
First and Fourth Amendment Rights, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 176, 180 (1973). While
the Supreme Court later overruled part of this district court decision, and upheld
the domestic as well as the foreign reporting provisions of the statute, Justice Douglas'
cogent dissent continued to rely upon the Katz standards as indicating that a signifi-
cant aspect of privacy was involved which could only be overcome by a properly
drawn warrant. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
237. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-21 (1972).
However, the Third Circuit has upheld the validity of a warrantless wiretap in a
case involving foreign security. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
238. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309-45 (1972).
At least one commentator, however, has argued against applying Katz to wiretapping.
See Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296, 313 (1968).
239. See Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right
to Privacy, 26 THE RECORD 546 (1971), where the author states: "One of the prin-
cipal reasons for the Court's failure to build the Fourth Amendment to Brandeis'
specifications has been the Court's recurring inclination to confine the Amendment to
the context of criminal law." Id. at 555.
240. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank was subsequently overruled by the Court in
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inspection. 4' Denial of access was prohibited by city statutes and
Frank was charged with a misdemeanor.242
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, began his considera-
tion of the issue with a discussion of the fourth amendment's back-
ground and evolution in Anglo-American legal history.
Against this background two protections emerge from the
broad constitutional proscription of official invasion. The first
of these is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy, the right to shut the door on officials of the state unless
their entry is under proper authority of law. The second, and in-
timately related protection, is self-protection: the right to resist
unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing of in-
formation to fortify the coercive power of the state against the
individual, information which may be used to effect a further
deprivation of life or liberty or property.243
Hence, the long evolution of the amendment made plain "that it was
on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to be
used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle
for fundamental liberty was fought." '244 Thus, even giving "the fullest
scope to this constitutional right to privacy," '245 Justice Frankfurter
found that its protection could not be invoked in that situation for sev-
eral reasons. Principally, the information was only sought for necessary
health regulations.24' In addition, the statute authorized search only
upon reasonable suspicion, restricted searching to daylight hours, did
not authorize the inspector to forcibly enter, and was the latest in a
long history of similar regulatory schemes.247 Clearly, the motive for
the intrusion was foremost in the Court's mind. For Frankfurter, the
statute touched only the periphery of fourth amendment privacy, and
it was designed to make the least restriction on privacy commensurate
with maintaining acceptable levels of public health.24 8
The dissenters, speaking through Justice Douglas, rejected this
distinction based upon the motive for the search.249 Douglas wrote:
"The decision today greatly dilutes the right of privacy which every
homeowner had the right to believe was part of our American heritage.
We witness indeed an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth
241. 359 U.S. at 361-62.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 365.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 366.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 366-71.
248. Id. at 367-72. See Riester and McMillen, Administrative Inspection Pro-
cedures Under the Fourth Amendment - Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY
L. REv. 155, 159-63 (1967).
249. 359 U.S. at 378 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment."25 The intent of the amendment, emphasized Douglas,
was to protect the citizen "against unreasonable searches and seizures
by government, whatever may be the complaint."'2 1  Its broad lan-
guage made no exception for civil invasions of privacy:
[The fourth amendment] was designed to protect the citizen
against uncontrolled invasion of his privacy. It does not make
the home a place of refuge from the law. It only requires the
sanction of the judiciary rather than the executive before that
privacy may be invaded. History shows that all officers tend to
be officious; and health inspectors, making out a case for criminal
prosecution of the citizen are no exception. . . . One invasion of
privacy by an official of government can be as oppressive as
another. . . . It would seem that the public interest in protecting
privacy is equally as great in one case as another. 252
In addition, in language foretelling his later penumbral approach in
Griswold, Justice Douglas declared: "[T]hese three amendments [the
first, fourth and fifth] are indeed closely related, safeguarding not
only privacy and protection against self-incrimination but 'conscience
and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.' "253 To allow
warrantless breaches of the privacy of one's home (irrespective of a
legitimate motive) was to ignore the clear presumption of privacy
within the document. Privacy was to be guarded against any invasion,
not just those involving the search for criminal evidence. 54 While the
criteria necessary for obtaining a health warrant were not the same as
those for a criminal one, the warrant procedure must nevertheless
be followed.2 , 5
Douglas' dissent remained only an appeal for the future of the
fourth amendment until 1967. In Camara v. Municipal Court,256 the
Court moved to limit the motive distinction it had propounded in
Frank. In Camara, the material facts were identical with those of
250. Id. at 374.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 381-82.
253. Id. at 376.
254. See Comment, State Health Inspection and "Unreasonable Search" The
Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L. REV. 513, 525 (1960).
255. In another case, the Court, by an equally divided vote, held the fourth amend-
ment inapplicable to the denying of access to municipal officials performing a routine
housing inspection. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). See also
Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment - A Rationale, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 290 (1965) ; Comment, An Inspector Calls - Must We Always
Let Him In?, The Constitution and Privacy of the Home, 5 S.D.L. REV. 40, 565-57
(1960).
256. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In the companion case of See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967), the Court imposed the same warrant requirements upon fire inspections of a
commercial warehouse. See Note, Reasonableness of Municipal Ordinance Inspection
Without Search Warrant, 14 Lov. L. REV. 377 (1967-68); Comment, Camara and
See: Accommodation Between the Right of Privacy and the Public Need, 47 NEBR.
L. REV. 613 (1968).
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Frank,"7 but the Court's reaction was somewhat different. Justice
White obviously undertook his opinion with a somewhat broader
conception of the fourth amendment than had Justice Frankfurter:
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in count-
less decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.
The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right
of the people which is "basic to a free society."2 "
The Justice noted that it had long been a central principle that, with
the exception of a few narrowly defined instances, "a search of private
property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."2 9 To exclude this protection
from civil searches would, ironically, only allow one to enjoy his
privacy if he were suspected of criminal activity. To Justice White,
then, Frank had been incorrect: protection from unreasonable civil
searches was not a peripheral interest of the fourth amendment.26 ° Yet,
this was not to say that no inspection could take place, or that, as
Frank had argued, any effective inspection program would be hobbled,
but only that such searches must have been authorized by a warrant
if the request to inspect was rejected. 261 Obviously, most residents
would not object to a properly conducted health inspection. 262
Justice White then proceeded to outline the requirements neces-
sary to secure a warrant in such a situation. After examining the
purposes of such inspections in urban areas, he found that the necessary
probable cause need only be based on the neighborhood - not the
individual household as somehow specially set apart.
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of
the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the con-
dition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon
specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling.
It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from
the standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a
257. Appellant, lessee of the ground floor of an apartment building, was suspected
by the city housing inspector of using part of his leasehold as a residence, in violation
of the building's occupancy permit. Appellant repeatedly refused to allow an inspec-
tion of his premises without a search warrant, and was arrested for violating the San
Francisco Housing Code. Released on bail, he applied for a writ of prohibition, argu-
ing that the inspection ordinance was unconstitutional for not requiring a search
warrant. 387 U.S. at 525-27. Compare text accompanying notes 240-41 supra.
258. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
259. 387 U.S. at 528-29.
260. See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The
Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37.
261. See Note, Administrative Searches - Closing the Door on Frank v. Mary-
land, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 207, 216 (1967).
262. See 387 U.S. at 539.
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"synthetic search warrant" and thereby to lessen the overall pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment. . . . But we do not agree.
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision
to search private property is justified by a reasonable govern-
mental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard.
If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, there
is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.2"'
Therefore, as long as a reasonable basis existed for seeking to inspect
a particular house, and as long as the search remained a relative limited
invasion of the dweller's privacy, then sufficient probable cause existed
to justify the warrant. 264 This was consistent with the intent of the
fourth amendment - "to be free from unreasonable government
invasions of privacy. '2 65
It is beyond question that the fourth amendment constitutes the
core of constitutional privacy, and this is particularly important when
one realizes that these concepts have been intertwined as far back as
English common law. While the Court has recently sanctioned several
procedures which undermine privacy, namely "stop and frisk ' 266 and
bodily searches, 6 7 the overall policy thrust has clearly been in the
direction of increased protection for privacy. Particularly significant
as noted earlier, was the test promulgated in Katz: an individual is
protected where he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Equally
significant has been the combined use of the first and fourth amend-
ments to safeguard political privacy. The Court has recently said:
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence
of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of "or-
dinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may
be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to con-
263. Id. at 538-39.
264. A similar type of balancing of interests was evidently at work in the recent
decision of Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). There, the Court held that a
welfare recipient, notified sufficiently in advance, could not refuse to admit a case-
worker to her home for purposes both "rehabilitative and investigative." Id. at 317.
The Court seemed to base its holding upon the presumption that the refusal to allow
a home visit did not result in criminal prosecution, only termination of assistance, and
as such, did not involve the fourth amendment. The Court attempted to distinguish
the Camara and See holdings on the basis of possible prosecution for violations, but as
one commentator has noted, the opinion "is logically unacceptable and totally incon-
sistent with the theory underlying Camara." Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action
Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1028-29 (1973).
265. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See 387 U.S. at 539. See also Meyers, Administra-
tive Inspection of Health Facilities as Unreasonable Searches, 22 FooD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 456, 465-67 (1967).
266. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). See also Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967)
Note, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma for the Courts, 41 U. So. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1968)
Comment, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1968).
267. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ; Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957). See also Kroll, Constitutionally Permissible Invasions of the
Body, 39 OKLA. B.J. 1904 (1966).
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stitutionally protected speech . . . Fourth Amendment protections
become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance
may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.26 s
This language parallels the "umbrella effect" urged by Professor
Emerson: the first amendment can link up with other provisions of
the Bill of Rights, expanding and strengthening their protections by
this unity.269 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has persistently relied
most heavily upon the fourth amendment - and its protection for the
privacy of location - as its most substantial basis for safeguarding
individual privacy.
IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SILENCE
As the preceding discussion has indicated, the constitutional right
to privacy is composed of several different Bill of Rights guarantees
protecting various aspects of individual and group privacy. The first
amendment preserves the anonymity of political belief and association,
while the fourth amendment is most concerned with safeguarding the
locus of privacy. But the most intimate aspects of privacy, the con-
science and innermost thoughts of the individual, are equally in need
of constitutional protection. It is the fifth amendment's ban against
compulsory self-incrimination, or the forcing of an individual to divulge
information that only he may know, that renders the constitutional
protection of privacy complete. The fifth amendment's right to silence
safeguards what some deem to be the most crucial aspect of individual
privacy, that manifestation of privacy which is the keynote of indi-
viduality and democracy.
A. The Policy of the Privilege
Any analysis of the fifth amendment's role in protecting privacy
must necessarily include some discussion of the policy behind the con-
cept of immunity from self-incrimination. Probably the most complete
catalogue of reasons supporting the privilege was offered by Justice
Goldberg in his opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:270
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions; our unwillingess to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our prefer-
268. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972).
269. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970). Emerson's
concept is linked to political surveillance in Meisel, Political Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 53, 61 (1973).
270. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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ence for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load" . . . ; our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of
each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life" . . . ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our
realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the
guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." '2 71
In a most influential volume, The Fifth Amendment Today, 2
Dean Griswold declared that "the privilege against self-incrimination
is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized." '  First, the privilege does away with the feasibility of
using torture to force an individual suspect to confess." 4 It also ren-
ders the criminal justice system more humane and accurate, since
coerced confessions are often incorrect as well as cruel.2 7 1 Second, the
privilege underlines the basic conception of an adversary, as contrasted
with an inquisitorial, system of criminal law.Y7 6 Since the legal system
cannot simply rely upon the defendant to provide evidence, it must
search out sufficient proof itself to demonstrate reasonable cause. This,
as a result, allows the potential defendant to remain free from inter-
ference until society can justify in a court of law its right to imprison
him. 2 7 7 This is similar to the "fair-fight" theory: in order to imprison
an individual, society ought to have more proof than simply the de-
fendant's own words to convict him.
2 78
Perhaps the most significant justification for the privilege, protec-
tion for privacy, was expressed by Griswold in the following language:
Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views
are essential elements in the charge, it may be most difficult to get
271. Id. at 55 (citations omitted). See also MacNaughton, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous
Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138 (1960) [hereinafter cited as MacNaughton].
272. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955) [hereinafter cited
GRISWOLD]. See also Griswold, The Fifth Amendment, 39 MAss. L.Q. 44 (Apr.
1954); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment as a Symbol, 28 CONN. B.J. 451 (1954);
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 191 (1956); Griswold,
The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 217 (1960).
273. GRISWOLD, supra note 272, at 7.
274. See Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 180, 184-85 (1956).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment would also forbid the use in
state court of a confession obtained by torture. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936).
275. See Annot. 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923).
276. GRISWOLD, supra note 272, at 8.
277. MacNaughton, supra note 271, at 146-49.
278. Id. at 148-49.
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evidence from sources other than the suspected or accused person
himself. Hence, the significance of the privilege over the years has
perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution
for such offenses as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the
privilege against self-incrimination has been a protection for free-
dom of thought and a hindrance to any government which might
wish to prosecute for thoughts and opinions alone.27
Justice Fortas, as well, noted, before his ascendance to the Court, that
the privilege arose to block the power of government to invade the
mind of the individual and "take dominion of his will. ' 28 ° "There is
little difference in theory, I suggest, between breaking into a man's
house and forcing an entry into his mind to compel him to testify
against himself."2'' In short, the privilege is "protection from un-
limited inquiry into private affairs under the guise of law."28 2 To
grant the government unlimited power to breach the privacy of a man's
mind is not only to undermine the privilege's long battle for "personal
dignity against collective might, '2 83 but to annihilate the very citadel
of individuality and independent judgment.28 4
This intimate relationship between privacy and self-incrimination
has been pointedly discussed by Dean McKay.2"5 For him, two argu-
ments favor a continued broad interpretation of the fifth amendment
privilege. The first is the need to insure morality in the operations
of government and integrity in the workings of the judicial system. 216
"The second principal argument in favor of continued liberal inter-
pretation of the privilege against self-incrimination arises out of the
concern for individual privacy that has always been a fundamental
tenet of the American value structure. '2 8 7 While a relationship be-
tween the amendment and privacy can be traced back to Boyd v. United
States s8 in 1886, it is the recent, ever-increasing demand for informa-
tion by government, especially legislative investigations, that has made
the fifth amendment crucial to the protection of privacy of belief, par-
279. GRISWOLD, supra note 272, at 8-9.
280. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.
AsS'N J. 91, 96-98 (1954).
281. Id. at 99.
282. Imlay, The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 147 (1952).
283. Kenealy, Fifth Amendment Morals, 3 CATH. LAW. 340, 342 (1957).
284. The privilege has also been justified on natural law grounds. See J. ANTIEAU,
RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 104-08 (1968); Connery, Morality and the Fifth Amend-
ment, 3 CATH. LAW. 137 (1957) ; McManus, The Natural Law and the Fifth Amend-
ment, 3 CATH. LAW. 6 (1957).
285. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193,
[hereinafter cited as McKay].
286. Id. at 209-10.
287. Id. at 210.
288. 116 U.S. 616. See notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra.
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ticularly since the Supreme Court has been hesitant to allow a full first
amendment defense of silence.2" 9 As Dean McKay stated:
[R]ecently an awareness has developed of the relationship between
the First and Fifth Amendments. It should not be difficult to
understand that the Fifth Amendment, rooted as it is in part in
the struggle in England during the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies to achieve freedom of conscience and freedom of religions,
bears a close relationship to the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. The First Amendment notion that no man may be
compelled to worship or to speak in any particular way - or at
all - may be regarded as an enlarged version of the more specific
Fifth Amendment notion that no man shall be required to convict
himself out of his own mouth. If the right to speak and write
without official restraint is guaranteed by the First Amendment,
as all agree is the case, does it not follow that there is a parallel
freedom not to speak and not to write? This may be described
as a freedom of silence ..0. o
Yet, as Charles Nutting has correctly argued, neither the first nor the
fifth amendments alone can fully protect privacy; complete protection
will only result when the interest in privacy is recognized for its own
significance and safeguarded accordingly.29'
The Supreme Court has chosen to interpret the "in any criminal
case"' 92 provision of the fifth amendment broadly, so that the general
principle behind the privilege can be fully implemented. This has re-
sulted in an expanded number of situations in which one can interpose
the constitutional ban of silence between himself and government: in
civil proceedings, 29 grand jury hearings,2 94 and Congressional investi-
gative hearings. Yet the Court, while extending the privilege, has
289. See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
290. McKay, supra note 285, at 212.
291. Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 533, 543-44
(1957). But see HooK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 121-23 (1963).
292. The amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
293. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
294. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950). But see Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Com-
pelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV.
470 (1974).
295. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). See also Coward, The Fifth Amendment: Its Use in
Congressional Investigations, 44 AM. B. Ass'r J. 433 (1958) ; Pollitt, The Fifth
Amendment Plea Before Congressional Committees Investigating Subversion, 106
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also recognized some significant limitations upon the fifth amend-
ment's protection for privacy.
B. Immunity Statutes
A very significant limitation upon the potential of the fifth amend-
ment to protect privacy has emerged with the evolution of immunity
statutes which compel an individual to testify in exchange for a guar-
antee against using his statements as evidence. The theory behind
these statutes is that the right against self-incrimination is personal to
the witness, and if he is given immunity coextensive in scope with the
privilege, he must testify.296 Repeatedly, the Court has insisted that
the privilege does not foreclose disclosures of an infamous, degrading
or embarrassing nature :297 "What is protected and guaranteed in the
Fifth Amendment is not silence but non-self-incrimination. '2s 8  Conse-
quently, if immunity from criminal prosecution is granted, the dictates
of the fifth amendment are satisfied, and society's interest in gathering
vital information outweighs any moral scruples as to silence. This
thesis is usually accompanied by the argument that the value of the
information so obtained also justifies any unpleasant ramifications -
infamy, obloquy, or destruction of reputation - the individual may
suffer.299 In short, if society is willing to pay the price of immunity
from prosecution, then a citizen no longer has the right to stand upon
his constitutional right to silence.
Until recently, the Supreme Court had adhered to certain basic
premises in its handling of the immunity issue. Of prime importance
was the nature of the immunity granted. The compelled evidence
could not be used either directly or to search out other derivative evi-
dence ("use" immunity),' °° and the immunity also had to include a
ban on any prosecution at all related to the disclosed information
("transactional" immunity).' ° 1
U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1958); Smith, The Privilege of Silence and the Legislative
Process, 41 GEO. L.J. 330 (1953); Zeserson, Fifth Amendment Waiver in Congres-
sional Investigations, 18 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 62 (1962).
296. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See notes 314-16 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 270-71 and accompanying text supra.
297. But see LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 317 (1968), where the
author argues emphatically that as early as 1679, the common law privilege was
meant to protect against infamy and obloquy as well as incrimination.
298. S. HOFSTADTER, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE IMMUNITY ACT OF 1954
18 (1956).
299. Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading
the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1598 (1963).
300. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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The primary statement of this position is found in Ullmaun v.
United States.3 2 The case arose under the Immunity Act of 1954,803
which compelled witnesses in national security cases, upon the approval
of a district court, to testify before courts, grand juries, and committees
of Congress. °4 A federal grand jury, inquiring into criminal espionage
and conspiracy, called Ullmann as a witness and granted immunity,
yet Ullmann refused to testify." 5 Ullmann argued that immunity from
criminal prosecution was not sufficient, for by testifying he opened
himself up to such manifold ramifications as possible loss of employ-
ment, expulsion from his union, compulsory state registration and in-
vestigation, limitation on his ability to secure passports, and general
public opprobium.3 a° Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority,
rejected this contention, reasoning that such consequences were not
criminal penalties within the meaning of the fifth amendment,3 0 7 and
the amendment's protection only extended to criminal prosecutions.
In short, since immunity displaced the danger, the reasons for the
privilege ceased, and so the privilege ceased.
For the minority, Justice Frankfurter's reading of the privilege
was far too narrow. Justice Douglas' lengthy dissent, concurred in
by Justice Black, pointed out the dilemma of those who favor an im-
pregnable area of constitutional silence. 0 s Justice Douglas cogently
explained the many penalties that could result from such forced testi-
mony. These penalties - loss of job, forced registration as a sub-
versive, and so forth - were "real and dread uncertainties that the
Immunity Act did not remove." ' 9 In reality, "the privilege of silence
was exchanged for a partial, undefined, vague immunity. It meant
that Congress had granted far less than it had taken away."3 10 The
purpose of the amendment was something broader than mere protec-
tion against ultimate criminal prosecution.
The guarantee against self-incrimination contained in the
Fifth Amendment is not only a protection against conviction and
prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity and
301. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
302. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
303. Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745.
304. The 1954 act evoked a great deal of controversy. See, e.g., Boudin, The
Immunity Bill, 42 GEO. L.J. 497 (1954); Rogge, The New Federal Immunity Act
and the Judicial Function, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 109 (1957); Comment, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Versus Immunity: Proposed Statutes, 41 GEO. L.J. 511
(1953); Comment, Immunity from Self-Incrimination Under the Federal Compulsory
Testimony Act, 46 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 673 (1955).
305. 350 U.S. at 423-25.
306. Id. at 502.
307. Id. at 430-31.
308. Id. at 440 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
309. Id. at 445.
310. Id.
[VOL. 19: p. 833
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 6 [1974], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons l w.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/1
PENUMBRAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
freedom of expression as well .... The evil to be guarded against
was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was
only part of the evil. The conscience and dignity of man were also
involved. So too was his right to freedom of expression guaran-
teed by the First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the
federally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could
not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness
against himself.8"
Infamy and disgrace were very real prices to pay for forced testimony.
Justice Douglas wrote, "The critical point is that the Constitution
places the right of silence beyond the reach of government. The Fifth
Amendment stands between the citizen and his government. '312
Recently, in Kastigar v. United States,1 3 the Court reassessed its
position and determined that use immunity, granted as part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,314 was alone sufficient to com-
pel a witness to testify. Transactional immunity was held to be outside
the scope of the fifth amendment, and hence not constitutionally man-
dated.3 1 Thus, the Kastigar holding significantly restricted fifth amend-
ment protection by enabling the government to probe the privacy of an
individual's mind as long as use immunity has been granted.3 16
In analyzing this trend away from privilege in favor of immunity
statutes, former United States Attorney General Brownell has sug-
gested that the change "reflects in part the view of some attorneys and
legal scholars that privilege against self-incrimination was somewhat
outmoded and should be strictly limited."3 7 Samuel Hofstadter has
argued that immunity statutes strike a realistic "golden mean" be-
tween the fifth amendment and the rights of society, which obviates
the necessity of repealing the amendment. 3 ' But as another commen-
tator has so effectively noted, immunity statutes allow great harm to
result from the compulsory testimony of political deviants.31 Histori-
cally, the fifth amendment has been intimately involved in the evolu-
tion of protections for the right to be silent in the face of government
demands for an individual's most confidential information, his private
311. Id. at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
313. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
314. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
315. Id. at 453. See Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Use Immunity: Half a
Loaf is Not Enough, 46 U. So. CAL. L. REv. 202 (1972).
316. This "exchange theory" is discussed in Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and
Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 447, 555-64 (1954).
317. Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution versus Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 28 TUL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1953).
318. S. HOFSTADTER, supra note 296, at 18.
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thoughts. 20 Yet today, that historic protection can be circumvented
almost as easily as if it did not exist. As one eminent practitioner in-
sists, the proponents of such statutes should be subjected to a heavy
burden of proof. "They must show why our Congress needs the extra-
ordinary power to inquire into private affairs and compel incriminating
testimony, a power without which this nation has well survived."32'
C. Compulsory Production of Records
As the Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United States3 22 in-
dicated, one's personal papers are of a particularly sensitive nature and
they may be equally as effective in incriminating the individual as his
spoken words. Therefore, the Supreme Court has continued to main-
tain from 1886 to the present that one's private papers cannot be
seized and utilized as evidence. Furthermore, this position has been
maintained even in light of the Court's otherwise complete destruction
of the mere evidence rule. However, the Court has allowed corporate
records - some of which are held to be quasi-public documents - to
be seized and used as evidence.3 23 This distinction has been based
upon the rationale that corporations do not enjoy the right to be free
from self-incrimination, and consequently the "intimate relationship"
between the fourth and fifth amendments is lacking.32 4
A related problem pertains to records required by law to be kept
in order to engage in certain types of businesses. In Shapiro v. United
States, 2 the Office of Price Administration had required specified
non-corporate businesses to maintain certain records which would
be inspected upon occasion as part of its price-regulating activities.
Shapiro's records were utilized to search out incriminating evidence.' 21
Shapiro argued that this procedure violated his right to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination, and further that a particular provision
of the statute immunized him from any prosecution based upon evi-
dence so derived.'27 The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson,
rejected these contentions. Congress, as part of its overall price-
320. Id. at 375. See also 0. ROGGE, TiHE FIRST AND THE FIFTH 138-203 (1960).
321. Boudin, supra note 304, at 507 (footnotes omitted).
322. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra.
323. See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) ; Wheeler v. United
States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
324. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-700 (1944).
325. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). See Note, Application of the Self-Incrimination Clause
to the Compulsory Production of Books and Papers Required to be Kept by Statute,
24 IND. L.J. 567 (1949).
326. 335 U.S. at 3-6.
327. Id. at 4-7, 22.
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regulation scheme, required these records to be maintained as a means
of enforcing the statute.-2 It clearly did not intend to frustrate this
enforcement mechanism by granting immunity to those who complied
with the record-keeping requirement.129 The immunity provision of
the regulation was only to be used to secure evidence which was con-
sidered to be privileged. 330
More importantly, the Chief Justice argued that such records,
whose keeping was statutorily mandated, were outside the scope of the
fifth amendment's protection. 3 ' Citing Davis v. United States,82
where gasoline ration coupons were found not to be private papers
when held by an individual acting in a custodial capacity, Vinson laid
down the broad principle that records required by law to be kept were
quasi-public documents and thus not privileged:
It may be assumed at the outset that there are limits which the
Government cannot exceed in requiring the keeping of records
which may be inspected by an administrative agency and may be
used in prosecuting statutory violations committed by the record
keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that those bounds have
been overstepped would appear to be evoked when there is a suffi-
cient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the
public concern so that the government can constitutionally . . .
require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection
by the Administrator."3
Shapiro, regulated under a comprehensive scheme to control com-
modity price levels in a time of emergency, clearly a matter of "public
concern," was subject to the record-keeping requirement. Thus, the
resulting records could not be characterized as privileged matter pro-
tected by the fifth amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter expressed the concern that the
Court's holding had great potential for future abuse. He suggested
that the required-records doctrine might attach whenever Congress
deemed an activity to be an "appropriate subject of governmental regu-
lation.' ' 3 4 However, simply incanting the phrase "required to be kept
by law" did not justify the government's undertaking inroads upon the
protection of the privilege.3 35 Perhaps, had Shapiro been involved in
utilities or with public property, the issue might have been different.
328. Id. at 8.
329. Id. at 31-32.
330. Id. at 30-31.
331. Id. at 32-34.
332. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
333. 335 U.S. at 32.
334. Id. at 50-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 6?.
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But Justice Frankfurter found the public interest nexus in this case to
be too far removed to justify breaching the fifth amendment.
If Congress by the easy device of requiring a man to keep the
private papers he has customarily kept can render such papers
"public" and non-privileged, there is little left to either the right
of privacy or the constitutional privilege.
3 6
In a separate dissent, Justices Jackson and Murphy also evidenced their
distaste for this potential power which might allow Congress to require
that a citizen keep an account of his own "deeds and misdeeds," and
then, upon demand, surrender these papers to help incriminate himself. 37
Although it can be argued that Shapiro was the result of the
historical circumstances of the drastic need to remedy economic in-
stability in the postwar nation, Congress has simply assumed that
regulatory statutes with similar provisions could be passed in many
other economic areas.338 This is understandable, if not commendable,
given the welfare state's ever-growing demand for information. Fortu-
nately, for the most part, the required-records doctrine has been limited
to areas other than political and personal beliefs.3 9 But as Professor
Meltzer has suggested, Shapiro's vague mandate presents the potential
for much more damaging applications of the doctrine.34 It is always
possible to have an ostensibly legitimate purpose disguise more in-
sidious motives. Even a perfectly legitimate motive may yield infor-
mation that could be used for improper activities. In response to this
danger, Professor Meltzer has suggested a test by which a balance
would be struck between legitimacy of government purpose other than
gaining confessions, and business privacy, which would be accorded
a lesser weight than personal privacy.3 4' However, as the experience
under the first amendment balancing rationale suggests, 42 the govern-
mental interest often would be held paramount in importance.
3 43
Though phrased in more absolute language than the fourth amend-
ment, the fifth amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as providing a less comprehensive protection of privacy. Throughout
its history, the privilege has been utilized in preventing compulsory
governmental probing of the privacy of the individual's innermost seat
336. Id. at 70.
337. Id. at 70-71 (Jackson & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
338. See Note, Books and Records and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 70, 97 (1966).
339. See Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (1965).
340. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarren Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CII. L. REv. 687 (1951).
341. Id. at 714-15.
342. See notes 109-23 & 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
343. But see Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETmics 87, 89 (1970).
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of individuality - his conscience and beliefs. Yet, in several key lines
of decisions, most notably with immunity statutes and the required-
records doctrine, the Court has sanctioned major incursions into this
area of constitutional protection. Nevertheless, the scope of the fifth
amendment, even as currently interpreted, provides a most invalu-
able and necessary counterpart to the other components of consti-
tutional privacy.
V. CONCLUSIONS: ABORTION AND PRIVACY
Several conclusions emerge from the previous discussion. Initially,
there now can be little doubt as to the existence of a fundamental con-
stitutional right to privacy. Yet this recognition only leads to a number
of secondary questions. Is there one right to privacy, a "zone of
privacy," as Justice Douglas' language in Griswold implied? Or are
there several varieties of privacy protected by different aspects of the
Bill of Rights? The answer at this point of development, oddly enough,
seems to be yes to both alternatives. Each of the three amendments
discussed above protects a different aspect of privacy. The first amend-
ment protects political beliefs and the privacy of association; the fourth
amendment safeguards the locus, vis-A-vis the individual, of privacy;
and the fifth amendment shelters the innermost thoughts and beliefs
of the individual. On occasion, usually in situations involving free
speech, several of these individual guarantees may combine to give an
"umbrella" effect, mutually reinforcing each other. For example, in
Stanley v. Georgia, 4 4 the issue was whether the state could punish the
mere possession of obscene matter within the privacy of the home. In
striking down this action, the Court reinforced its first amendment
position recognizing the right to receive information and ideas by in-
voking fourth amendment privacy of location as essential for imple-
menting free speech:
Moreover, in the context of this case - a prosecution for mere
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's
own home - that right takes on an added dimension. For also
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited cir-
cumstances, from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one'sprivacy.345
A similar type of interlocking was demonstrated in United States v.
United States District Court.346 However, there the first amendment
344. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v.
Georgia, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 203.
345. 394 U.S. at 564.
346. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See note 238 and accompanying text supra.
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reinforced the fourth rather than the reverse situation found in Stanley.
Therefore, in most situations, it will be possible for the Court to protect
privacy by invoking one or more of the key Bill of Rights protections.
But what then of the comprehensive right to privacy enunciated
in Griswold? The Court has spoken only twice about this type of
privacy since that landmark decision was handed down. In Eisenstadt
v. Baird,347 the Court expanded Griswold to include the distribution
of contraceptive devices and information to unmarried persons:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 4
However, the Court's opinion in Eisenstadt seemed to be at least
equally based upon equal protection grounds - if married individual's
have access to contraceptives, then so must unmarried individuals."4 9
The second invocation of the general constitutional right to
privacy occurred in the recent abortion decisions. 50 In establishing
the unhindered right to abortion during the first trimester of preg-
nancy, the Court concluded that the offending statutes had attempted
to infringe upon petitioners' privacy with insufficient justification.3"'
Whether the source was the due process clause or the ninth amend-
ment,3 52 the Court spoke about a general right to privacy - at least
347. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
348. Id. at 453.
349. Id. at 452-55.
350. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
See Comment, The Right to Privacy: Does it Allow a Woman the Right to Deter-
mine Whether to Bear Children?, 20 AM. U.L. REv. 136 (1970) ; Note, The Abortion
Cases: A Return to Lochner, or a New Substantive Due Process?, 37 ALBANY L.
REv. 776 (1973). On abortion as regulated by law generally, see Means, The Phoenix
of Abortion Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right about to Arise
from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common
Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). For sharp criticism of the decisions, par-
ticularly relating to the Court's declaring the unborn child not to be a person
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, see Rice, The Dred Scott Case of
the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1059 (1973).
351. 410 U.S. at 163-66.
352. See Clark, supra note 34, at 108-10. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority in Roe v. Wade, stated that for the purposes of that decision it did not
matter whether the right to privacy was "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people. . . ." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (emphasis added). It has been argued
that the italicized language indicated a preference by the present Court for Justice
Harlan's "fundamental rights" theory as a basis for the right to privacy. Note, On
Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670,
697-98 (1973). See notes 46-56 and accompanying text supra. However, it also has
been asserted that the language simply reaffirmed the penumbral theory as to the
origin of the right. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 928 (1973). The author considers the Court's statement to be
simply a recognition that multiple constitutional theories have been put forward tojustify the right to privacy, and, with the exception of not resting the right exclu-
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in sex, family, and marital matters.353 Several aspects of these opinions
are significant. First, the Court clearly staked its position on a long
series of cases recognizing privacy as a general desideratum. In short,
the Court espoused the presumption that constitutional privacy existed
and could not be infringed unless competing considerations were over-
whelming. Second, the Court very carefully indicated that the right
to privacy was not absolute: "The Court's decisions recognizing a
right of privacy also acknowledged that some state regulation in areas
protected by that right is appropriate." ' 4 Therefore, if the state could
demonstrate some "compelling interest" - such as safeguarding
health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life -
then the right to privacy would have to be balanced against these
competing needs. 5
It is not surprising that the Court has chosen to rely upon a bal-
ancing test, although such a test may be quite difficult to apply. Bal-
ancing has been the device whereby the Court has determined the
extent of privacy under the first amendment (the need of government
for certain types of information), the fourth amendment (emergency
situations, stop and frisk, bodily searches), and the fifth amendment
(immunity statutes and required records). As a result, the Court in
the abortion decisions only absolutely barred state intervention during
the first trimester; beyond that, the state's interests were more com-
pelling and varying degrees of intervention were acceptable." ' The
Court most probably will continue to employ this balancing approach in
any future applications of the right to privacy to new areas. Of course,
the still unanswered question is whether the Court will only apply
the composite right in matters pertaining to a "marital-sexual-familial
privacy right." ' It seems likely, given the increasing need to protect
privacy, and the dangers that technology and growing governmental
demands for information present, that the composite right will be
applied in additional areas in the future.3 58
Hence, the real significance of the composite approach of Griswold
and the recent abortion decisions is their establishment of the presump-
sively upon the ninth amendment, the Court was unwilling at that point in time to
state definitively which of these theories it deemed most correct.
353. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
354. Id. at 153-54.
355. See Heymann and Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765, 775 (1973).
356. 410 U.S. at 154-55, 163-66.
357. See Note, In Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1559, 1569 (1973), where it is argued that the Court will not extend the right
to privacy beyond this realm.
358. For an effective discussion of the variety of cases being litigated in which
the right to privacy is claimed, as well as some indications of future applications of
the right in a variety of areas, see Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973). But see note 357 supra. 51
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tion that individual privacy is so vital and fundamental a right that
government must be amply prepared to justify any intrusions upon it.
As such, these cases may be far more important than their substantive
holdings; they firmly associate the idea of privacy with the Bill of
Rights. This has two important effects on the right to privacy: first,
it establishes privacy as a general right which is equally as crucial as
the more familiar, explicitly stated protections of the Bill of Rights;
and second, it justifies the Court's more vigorous and expansive utili-
zation of the narrower rights of privacy protected by the individual
amendments. Clearly, the bulk of future litigation on constitutional
privacy will involve these individual protections rather than the com-
posite right. But the two concepts of privacy must necessarily go
together. As such, the Supreme Court has in hand a potent device to
combat the inexorable pressures against individual and group privacy
that the future will bring.
52
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